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FEDERAL PROCEDURE - JUDGMENTS - MonoN FOR JUDGMENT NoTWITHSTANDING nm VERDICT REQUIRED BEFORE APPELLATE CoURT CAN ENTER
JUDGMENT-Petitioner brought suit against respondent railroad under the Jones
Act1 for the wrongful death of her husband. At the completion of all the evidence, the railroad moved to dismiss the complaint and further asked for a
directed verdict. The trial court submitted the case to the jury reserving its
decision on the motion. A verdict was returned for the petitioner. Within ten
days of the verdict, the railroad moved to have the verdict set aside on the ground
that it was excessive, contrary to the law, to the evidence, and to the weight of
the evidence. Two months later the trial court denied this motion as well as the
pre-verdict motions for dismissal and directed verdict. On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the motion for directed verdict should have been

141 Stat. L. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1946) §688.
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granted.2 Both parties agreed that the reversal required the trial court to enter
judgment for the railroad. On certiorari, held, reversed, Justices Frankfurter,
Jackson, Burton and Minton dissenting. Rule 50(b) 3 requires that a losing
party move for judgment n.0.11. within ten aays after verdict before an appellate
court can enter judgment in his favor, and a motion to have the verdict set aside
does not satisfy this requirement. Johnson 11. N.Y., N.H. & R.R. Co., 344 U.S.
48, 73 S.Ct. 125 (1952).
As a result of confusion brought about by three Supreme Court decisions4
regarding directed verdicts and motions for judgment n.0.11., rule 50 (b) was
promulgated in 1938.5 In essence, the rule provided that the trial court can
reserve decision on a motion for directed verdict, without expressly stating so, by
submitting the case to the jury and leaving the motion undecided. After the
rendition of the verdict, the trial court may examine the verdict and upon proper
motion by the party concerned either grant a new trial or a judgment n.0.11.6
The question soon arose as to whether it was necessary for the losing party to ask
for judgment n.0.11. before an appellate court could grant judgment in his favor.
It was decided in Cone 11. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.7 that the failure of
the losing party to ask for judgment n.0.11. within ten days after the rendition of
the verdict precluded the appellate court from entering judgment for that party.8
This holding was extended in Liquor Co. 11. San Roman9 to cover the situation
where the trial court erroneously entered judgment for one party upon motion
for directed verdict. Thus even where the case was not submitted to the jury the
Supreme Court held that the losing party, if he is to get judgment on appeal,
must ask the court which directed the verdict against him for a judgment n.0.11.
This decision has been justly criticized on the ground that it requires the losing
party to go through an empty ceremony, since it is extremely unlikely that a
(2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 194.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1946).
4 Slocum v.· New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523 (1913). In
this case it was held that a state statute which provided for a judgment n.o.-v. in situations where the trial court should have directed a verdict could not be followed by the
federal courts since it was contrary to the Seventh Amendment in that it allowed a "reexamination" of the verdict. Later in Northern Ry. Co. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65, 47 S.Ct. 491
(1927), the Supreme Court allowed the trial court to choose between alternative verdicts
requested of the jury where the trial court was unable to decide whether a directed verdict
was proper. Still later, in Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct.
890 (1935), the Supreme Court held that where the trial court expressly reserved decision
on the motion for directed verdict, distinguishing the Slocum case on this point, it could
choose between the jury verdict and the motion for directed verdict without violating the
Seventh Amendment.
u For an excellent insight into the problems which existed prior to the adoption of rule
50(b) in 1938, see Thayer, "Judicial Administration," 63 Umv. PA. L. REv. 585 (1915).
6 See Scott, "Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure," 31 HARv. L. REv.
669 (1918), for the general background of rule 50(b).
7 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752 (1947).
s For interesting discussions of the case see 47 CoL. L. REv. 1077 (1947) and 46
MicH. L. REv. 264 (1947).
o 332 U.S. 571, 68 S.Ct. 246 (1947).
2
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court which directs a verdict against a party will later enter judgment notwithstanding that verdict.10 The principal case again follows the literal language of
rule SO(b) most strictly. However, the decision did not come without warning
for in 1946 the Supreme Court refused to adopt an amendment to rule SO(b)
proposed by the advisory committee which would have allowed an appellate
court to enter judgment for the losing party even though he did not move for
judgment n.o.v.11 It is now necessary to ask for a judgment n.o.v. in almost so
many words, and where this is not done an appellate court is powerless to award
judgment for the losing party. The dissenting opinion strongly objects to the
"abracadabra of obedience" to rule SO(b) required by the principal decision.12
Whatever the merits of the dissenting opinion, it is well to remember that the
Supreme Court has held that it will not tolerate anything less than full and literal
compliance with rule 50(b). It becomes necessary, therefore, that a motion for
judgment n.o.v. be made in express language within the ten day period13 and,
if this is not done, the appellate court is unable to enter judgment for the losing
party.

Joseph M. Kortenhof,. S.Ed.

10 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PltACTICE 2338 (1952).
11 See 5 MooRE, FEDEBAL PBACTICE 2308 et seq. (1952), for an analysis of the
rationale underlying the advisocy committee's proposal. See also, 2 BAllll.oN AND HotT.loFF,

FEDEBAL PRAcnCE AND P11.oCEDmm 783 (1950).

12 Principal case at 57. The dissenting opinion strongly urges that nothing in rule
SO(b) requires a losing party to move for judgment n.o.v. in a "particular form of words."
lS "Respondent's motion should be treated as nothing but what it actually was, one to
set aside the verdict-not one to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict." Principal
case at 51.

